Illusions of replication, illusions of truth
Abstract
Shiffrin et al. argue that scientific practice often produces illusions of understanding; situations in which familiar inferential tools generate misplaced confidence. We describe a related illusion that arises not from statistical misapplications, but from ordinary theory testing itself. Here we highlight a different source of epistemic uncertainty or overconfidence; one that emerges even when statistical tools are used correctly, effect sizes are precisely estimated, findings replicate without controversy, and heterogeneity is explicitly acknowledged within hierarchical models.
Citation
Bibtex
@article{davis-stober_etal:in_press:replication,
title = {{I}llusions of replication, illusions of truth},
author = {Davis-Stober, Clintin P. and Sokratous, Konstantina and Vandekerckhove, Joachim},
year = {in press},
journal = {Computational Brain \& Behavior},
doi = {10.1007/s42113-026-00276-w}
}